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Hedging Price Risk in the Presence of Crop Yield and Revenue Insurance
Abstract
The demand for hedging against price uncertainty in the presence of crop yield
and revenue insurance contracts is examined for French wheat farms. The
rationale for the use of options in addition to futures is first highlighted through
the characterization of the first-best hedging strategy in the expected utility
framework. It is then illustrated using numerical simulations. The presence of
options is shown to allow the insured producer to adopt a more speculative
position on the futures market. Futures are shown to be performing, in terms of
willingness to receive. Options are weakly performing when futures markets are
unbiased, while they are more performing when futures markets are biased.
Key words: crop insurance, hedging, producer welfare, simulation.
Introduction
The agricultural sector is characterized by a strong exposure to risk which is likely to
increase in the future. Production risk is expected to increase due to stricter use of inputs
creating potential environmental damage. Price risk is likely to rise because of agricultural trade
liberalization. In Europe, this increasing price volatility would be induced by the recent reforms
of the Common Agricultural Policy. Meanwhile, insurance or hedging contracts which allow
European farmers to manage price and yield uncertainty are limited. For example, French
farmers can only buy named-peril insurance contracts (against hail, storm and frost) and hedging
contracts against price risk proposed by the European board of trade  EURONEXT are
confidential.
1 This induces the private and public markets to examine the development of new
hedging and insurance instruments. In particular, they wish to investigate the
substituability/complementarity between crop yield and revenue insurance programs and
hedging contracts against price risk.
There is a growing literature on optimal hedging under price and quantity uncertainty. In
pioneering work, McKinnon (1967) reports that hedge ratios minimizing variance decline as
yield variability relative to price variability increases. Rolfo (1980) shows that the ratio of
optimal futures hedge to expected output should be below unity for individuals with a
logarithmic utility function.  Losq (1982) generalizes this result when price and output are
independent and the marginal utility function is convex. More recently, Moschini and  Lapan
(1995) analyze optimal hedging decisions for firms facing price, basis and production risk,
assuming futures and options (at a single strike price) can be used. Under restrictive assumptions
on the producer’s behavior towards risk and on the yield and price distributions, they show that
production risk provides a rationale for the use of options. This finding is extended by Mahul
(2002) from the characterization of the first-best hedging solution.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the demand for hedging against price risk in the
presence of crop yield and revenue insurance contracts using numerical simulations. The main
originality of this paper is to allow insured producers to use options at different strike prices in
addition to futures. The design of the optimal hedging instrument is first analyzed in the
expected utility framework when the producer is endowed with a crop yield insurance or a crop
revenue insurance policy. The rationale for the use of options is highlighted from the non-
                                                                
1 Commodities contracts available on Euronext are European rapeseed futures and options, rapeseed meal futures,
European rapeseed oil futures, mealing wheat futures and corn futures. Volumes traded in the 2000 year relative to
French production are less than 10%, except European rapeseed futures (165%).3
linearity of the first-best solution. Because the decision problem is complex, we use stochastic
simulation and numerical optimization to investigate the demand for hedging by two French
wheat farms. Five mutually exclusive agricultural insurance policies are modeled: individual
and aggregate crop yield insurance, individual and aggregate crop revenue insurance, and the
U.S. Crop Revenue Coverage. The insured producer can also buy or sell futures and options on
futures. Contrary to recent empirical studies (see, for example, Wang et al., 1998;  Coble,
Heifner and Zuniga, 2000), options contracts available at different strike prices can be jointly
used with futures.
Our results show the role of futures, in addition to yield or revenue insurance policy, in the
reduction of revenue uncertainty. The shape of the optimal hedging strategy is then derived from
the optimal futures and straddles hedge ratios. The impact of perceived bias in futures prices at
planting on optimal hedging decisions is examined through a decomposition of the hedge ratio.
The presence of straddles allows the producer to take better advantage of this bias in adopting a
more speculative position. The effect of insurance guarantee level on the optimal futures and
straddles positions is also evaluated. Futures and crop yield insurance are complement, while
futures and crop revenue insurance are substitute. The performance of the optimal combination
between insurance policies and financial instruments is investigated through the evaluation of a
willingness to receive measure. A conclusion highlights the main results and discusses several
extensions to this work.
Some Remarks on Optimal Hedging Contract under Production and Price Uncertainty
We consider a competitive farmer/producer who makes all insurance and hedging decisions
at the beginning of the period (at planting), whereas all uncertainty is resolved at the end of the
period (at harvest). The farmer is assumed to produce a single commodity and he faces
production and price uncertainty. This implies that the exact output and the exact price at which
he sells his output (the individual cash price) are unknown at the beginning of the period.
Production risk and price risk are formally represented by positive random variables  y ~ and  p ~,
respectively.
2 The cost function depends on the expected output  y E y ~ = , where  E denotes the
expectation operator, and it is denoted  ( ) y c . The expected production is related to planted
acreage (normalized to unity) and intensity of other inputs which are given parameters in this
one-period model. They are assumed to be known at the beginning of the period. The purpose of
this section is to examine the impact of insurance contract on the hedging demand.
Consequently, two assumptions are made for the ease of the analysis: (i) production and price
risks are stochastically independent and (ii) insurance and hedging contracts are based on
individual production and individual cash price. Assumption ( i) means that the systemic
component of the output risk is not large enough to affect output price. Assumption (ii) means
that the model is free of yield basis risk and price basis risk. Both assumptions will be removed
in the simulation model.
The producer is assumed to be risk averse, with preferences represented by an increasing and
concave  von  Neumann-Morgenstern utility function  u.
3 He is endowed with an insurance
contract that consists of an indemnity payoff net of the premium denoted  NI . This net
indemnity schedule is based on the realized yield under crop yield insurance,  ( ) y NI , and on the
realized gross revenue (individual yield times individual cash price) under crop revenue
                                                                
2 Random variables are denoted with a tilde, their realizations without.
3 The producer may be risk neutral but he may behave as if he were risk averse. His (apparent) risk aversion may be
due to market imperfections (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993), to the direct and indirect costs of financial distress, to
the existence of taxes that are a convex function of earnings (Smith and Stulz, 1985).4
insurance,  ( ) py NI . The design of the first-best hedging instrument against price risk is
examined. It is described by the couple  [ ] P J(.),  where  ( ) p J  is the non-negative payoff when
the realized price is  p  and  ( ) ( ) p EJ P ~ 1 l + = , where  0 ‡ l  is the loading rate, is the premium
which is assumed to be proportional to the expected payoff. The first-best solution maximizes
the producer’s expected utility of final wealth under the above-mentioned constraints:
(1)




subject to  () 0 . ‡ J  and  ( ) ( ) p EJ P ~ 1 l + = ,
where p ~ is the producer’s final wealth corresponding to
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) P p J y NI y c y p - + + - = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p
when he is endowed with the crop yield insurance contract and
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) P p J y p NI y c y p - + + - = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p
when the revenue insurance policy is available.
Under crop yield insurance, the indemnity schedule is independent of the random output
price. The production risk can thus be interpreted as an independent (multiplicative) background
risk. From Mahul (2002), the first-best indemnity schedule can be shown to be decreasing when
the realized price is lower than a strike price  p ˆ , and it is zero otherwise. The first-best marginal
payoff function satisfies:
(4) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )




















- = ¢   for all  p p ˆ < ,
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) P p J y NI y c y p - + + - = ~ ~ ~ p  and  cov is the covariance operator. Contrary to the
case with no crop insurance examined by Mahul (2002), it should be noticed that
( ) y I N p y ¢ + = ¶ ¶p  can be either positive or negative without any additional assumption of the
crop yield insurance policy. Suppose that  ( ) [ ] Q y y y NI - - = 0 , ˆ max d  where  y ˆ  is the yield
guarantee, d  is the price election and  Q is the insurance premium. Therefore  y ¶ ¶p  will be
positive for all  y  and all  d > p . The covariance term is thus positive if the producer exhibits
prudence,  0 > ¢ ¢ ¢ u .
4  The first-best marginal payoff thus satisfies:
(5) ( ) y p J - > ¢   for all  ] [ p p ˆ , d ˛  with  p ˆ < d .
The sign of the covariance term is indeterminate otherwise. This covariance term vanishes if the
utility function is quadratic,  0 = ¢ ¢ ¢ u .
5 We thus have  ( ) y p J - = ¢  for all  ( ) 0 : > p J p . This implies
that the optimal hedging instrument is  ( ) [ ] 0 , ˆ max p p y p J - =  where  p ˆ  is the strike price. This
                                                                
4 The convexity of the marginal utility,  0 > ¢ ¢ ¢ u , has long been recognized has a realistic behavioral assumption. It
is a necessary condition for decreasing absolute risk aversion. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for an
increase in future income risk to induce consumers to save more (Kimball, 1990).
5 The limitations of this utility function to represent attitudes towards risk are well-known (e.g., the index of
absolute risk aversion increases with wealth). However, this function can also represent a risk-neutral producer
facing a quadratic and convex tax schedule.5
is equivalent to buying  y  put options at strike price  p ˆ . Consequently, introducing a crop yield
insurance contract does not affect the form of the first-best hedging contract under a quadratic
utility function. Obviously, the optimal strike price will be altered. When the utility function is
not quadratic, we deduce from equation (4) that the first-best hedging contract is not linear in the
price. This thus provides a rationale for the use of options in order to replicate as close as
possible this non-linearity.
When the producer is endowed with a revenue insurance contract, it can be shown (see the
Appendix) that there exists a strike price  p ˆ  under which indemnity payoffs are made and first-
best marginal payoff function satisfies
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )
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for all  p p ˆ < , where  ( ) ( ) ( ) P p J y p NI y c y p - + + - = ~ ~ ~ p .
When the (apparent) utility function is quadratic, the covariance term in (6) vanishes.
Contrary to the crop yield insurance case, the first right-hand side term in (6) depends on the
revenue insurance contract through its marginal indemnity function. If the revenue insurance
schedule satisfies  ( ) [ ] Q py R py NI - - = 0 , ˆ max  where  R ˆ  is the revenue guarantee and  Q is the
insurance premium, then we have
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] y p I N y E p J ~ 1 ~ ¢ + - = ¢ ,
for all  p p ˆ < . The slope of the first-best hedging contract thus clearly depends on the revenue
guarantee  R ˆ .
Under the general case where the utility function is not necessarily quadratic, the covariance
term in (7) is positive if the insured producer is not over-indemnified when a loss occurs, i.e.,
( ) 1 - ‡ ¢ py I N  where the weak inequality is strict at some  py under partial insurance. The first-
best marginal payoff thus satisfies
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] y p I N y E p J ~ 1 ~ ¢ + - > ¢ ,
for all  p p ˆ < . The marginal payoff function expressed in (6) stresses the non-linearity of the
first-best hedging instrument with respect to the output price. This gives a rationale for the use
of option, not only when the utility function is non-quadratic, as in the crop yield insurance case,
but also when it is quadratic.
The Simulation Model
Insurance and Hedging Contracts Offered
We aim at investigating the role of insurance and financial markets in the management of
production and price risk in agriculture through a simulation model. Five insurance products and
four hedging contracts are modeled in order to reflect the products that are currently offered to
the U.S. farmers and that may be offered to the French farmers in the near future.6
In the insurance market, two crop yield insurance policies and three crop revenue insurance
contracts are assumed to be at the producer’s disposal. These contracts are mutually exclusive
and they are sold at an actuarially fair price.
6
Among the crop yield insurance programs, we consider the Individual Yield Crop Insurance
(IYCI) contract in which the indemnity is based on individual yield, denoted  y . Formally, the
IYCI indemnity schedule net of the premium satisfies:
(9) ( ) [ ]
IYCI IYCI Q y y E F y NI - - = 0 , ~ max g d ,
where  F  is the futures price at planting, d  is a fraction of this price, g  is a percentage of the
expected individual yield, and 
IYCI Q  is the insurance premium. This contract corresponds to the
multiple peril crop insurance program offered to the U.S. farmers. The second crop yield
insurance contract is based on aggregate yield of a surrounding area, denoted  q. It is called
Area Yield Crop Insurance (AYCI) and its net indemnity schedule is
(10) ( ) [ ]
AYCI AYCI Q q q E F q NI - - = 0 , ~ max f d ,
where  q E~ is the expected area yield, f  is a percentage of the expected area yield and 
AYCI Q  is
the associated premium. Such a contract has been widely examined in the literature (see, for
example, Miranda, 1991; Skees, Black and Barnett, 1997; Mahul, 1999; Mahul and Vermersch,
2000; Vercammen, 2000). It is less exposed to asymmetric information problems, i.e., moral
hazard and adverse selection, because farmers cannot alter the indemnity and information about
area yield are usually more easily available and more accurate than information about individual
yield. However, this contract does not provide a coverage against yield basis risk generated by
the imperfect correlation between individual and area yields. It looks like the insurance policy
offered by the Group Risk Plan to the U.S. farmers.
Three different revenue insurance policies are under consideration. Contrary to crop yield
insurance programs, they provide a coverage for both yield and price uncertainty. Under the
Individual Revenue Insurance (IRI) contract, the net indemnity schedule is
(11) ( ) [ ]
IRI IRI Q fy y FE fy NI - - = 0 , ~ max g ,
where  f  is the futures price at harvest, g  is a percentage of the expected individual yields times
the futures price at planting , y FE~, and 
IRI Q  is the insurance premium. It looks like the Revenue
Assurance and Income Protection programs proposed to the U.S. farmers. In the spirit of the
AYCI contract, the indemnity payoff of the Area Revenue Insurance (ARI) policy is defined as
(12) ( ) [ ]
ARI ARI Q fq q E F fq NI - - = 0 , ~ max f ,
where 
ARI Q  is the associated premium. This policy looks like the new U.S. insurance product
introduced as a pilot program in 1999, called Group Risk Income Protection (Barnett, 2000).
Finally, the Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) contract, which has the highest enrollment among
the U.S. farmers, is considered. Its main originality is to provide a replacement-cost protection
when yields are low and prices are high. Its indemnity net of the premium 
CRC Q  is
                                                                
6 We thus implicitly assume that these insurance programs are subsidized.7
(13) ( ) ( ) [ ]
CRC CRC Q fy y E f F y f NI - - = 0 , ~ , max max , g .
It is noteworthy that the indemnity schedules of the three revenue insurance programs are based
on futures prices and not individual cash prices. This means that the producer is exposed to price
basis risk caused by the imperfect correlation between individual cash and futures prices.
Since the purpose of this paper is to examine the demand for hedging, we do not give the
producers to choose the percentage yield guarantees and the coverage level. We assume that the
price election is equal to the futures price at harvest perceived by the agents,  1 = d , the
individual yield guarantee under IYCI, IRI and CRC is 80 percent of the expected individual
yield (20% deductible),  % 80 = g , and the area yield guarantee under AYCI and ARI is 90
percent of the expected area yield (10% deductible),  % 90 = f . This difference in yield
guarantees between insurance contracts based on individual or area yields is justified as follows.
Individual yield and revenue insurance contracts provide a (partial) coverage against the whole
individual yield risk, whereas area yield and revenue insurance policies only offer a (partial)
coverage against the systemic component of the individual yield risk. For a given level of yield
guarantee, the producer will thus prefer actuarially fair contracts based on individual yields
rather than area yields. In addition, maximum on yield guarantee is usually justified to mitigate
moral hazard problems (introducing a deductible would induce insured producers not to alter
their preventive behavior towards risk). This problem is significantly reduced under area yield
or revenue insurance because producers cannot alter the indemnity based upon area yield.
Consequently, it seems realistic to assume that f  is higher than g .
Real-world financial markets offer standardized forms of hedging contracts, such as futures
contracts and options on futures. Since these tools are linear or piecewise linear with the price, it
should be noticed that they usually preclude the replication of the first-best hedging instrument
as expressed in equations (4) and (6). This creates a second source of incompleteness on
financial markets, in addition to price basis risk. Following Mahul (2002), we assume that the
producer has the opportunity to buy or sell not only futures but also options on futures available
are different strike prices. We restrict our attention to the case where straddles at three different
strike prices are available.
7 We denote  i k  for  3 , 2 , 1 = i  the strike price where  3 2 1 k k k < < ,  0 > x
the futures quantity sold,  0 > i z  for  3 , 2 , 1 = i  the quantity of straddles at strike price  i k  sold, and
i P for  3 , 2 , 1 = i  the associated straddle premium. The hedging strategy is thus defined as
(14) ( ) [ ] [ ] ￿
=
- - + - =
3
1 i
i i i k f P z f F x f S .
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7 A short (resp. long) straddle can be constructed by selling (resp. buying) one put and one call at the same strike
price.8
It is noteworthy that, when  S  is decreasing everywhere, a short (resp. long) position in the
straddle at strike price  i k , i.e.,  0 > i z  (resp.  0 < i z ), means that the optimal hedging strategy  S
is globally concave (resp. convex) around  i k .
Straddles are assumed to be sold at a fair price, i.e.,  i i k f E P - =
~
 for  3 , 2 , 1 = i , and the use of
futures generate no transaction costs (commissions, deposits…).
8 The strike prices of the
straddles are chosen such that the lowest (resp. the intermediate, the highest) one is equal to 90
(resp. 100, 110) percent of the futures price at harvest:  F k · = 9 . 0 1 ,  F k = 2  and  F k · = 1 . 1 3 .
Additional notations are defined as follows:  0 w  is producer’s (nonrandom) initial wealth,  A is
total acreage devoted to the crop,  c is the production cost per unit of acreage,  d  is the direct
subsidy per unit of acreage. The producer’s final wealth is thus given by
(16) ( ) [ ] f S NI d c y p A w
i
i
~ ~ ~ ~
0 + + + - + = P ,
where i represents one of the five insurance policies. The optimal hedging decisions will be the
solution of the maximization of the producer’s expected utility of final wealth. The utility
function is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA),  ( ) ( )
q p q p
- - - =
1 1 1 u  with
1 „ q .
Selected farms
The demand for hedging in the presence of crop yield or revenue insurance contracts is
illustrated with individual farm yield data for French wheat farmers located in two regions, Ile
de France and Centre. These regions of the northern part of France are characterized by highly
fertile soils and temperate climates. Agriculture is dominated by cereals and oilseeds produced
using intensive cropping technology. We chose to work with individual data rather than
aggregate data, contrary to recent studies on optimal hedging (see, for example, Coble, Heifner
and Zuniga, 2000). Using individual data allows us to take into account not only the systemic
component of individual risk but also its idiosyncratic part which partially vanishes through the
aggregation of individual data. We are thus able to measure precisely the impact of the two
components of individual yield and price risks on the producer’s optimal hedging strategy and
welfare. However, individual yield and cash price data are only available over the eight year
period 1992-1999 from the French Farm accountancy Data Network. Regional yields in Ile de
France and Centre are used as area yields and they are estimated from the individual yields of all
the farmers located in each region. Because futures contracts for wheat have been launched in
France by the MATIF since March 1998, the data base is too recent to give relevant information
on futures prices. Consequently, we used national cash prices on the physical market of Rouen
to approximate futures prices. The price basis risk is thus only caused by the imperfect
correlation between individual and national cash prices.
9
In the simulation model, the producer’s final wealth is a function of four random variables:
farm yield (y), area yield (q), farm cash price (p) and futures price (f). Given the small size of
our samples, we chose to apply the method proposed by Fleishman (1978) and extended by Vale
and Maurelli (1983) to generate multivariate non-normal distributions. Fleishman’s technique to
simulate non-normal random numbers in the  univariate case consists of defining a random
                                                                
8 In the absence of transaction costs, forward contracts are not considered since their usefulness with respect to the
futures contracts is based on the tradeoff between transaction costs and price basis risk.
9 Yield data were adjusted for secular trends to reflect 1999 production levels. Price data were adjusted by inflation
rate to reflect 1999 price levels.9
variable as a linear combination of the first three powers of a standard normal random variable.
The random variable is thus characterized by its first four moments (i.e., mean, variance,
Skewness and Kurtosis).
  Vale and  Maurelli (1983,  eq. (11)) provide the polynomial
transformation to compute from the correlation between two non-normal random variables the
(intermediate) correlation between the associated two normal random variables. Multivariate
random distributions are then generated from this intermediate correlation matrix.
Since we focus on farms producing a single commodity (wheat), two producers were selected
among farms in which the fraction of the acreage devoted to wheat is higher than 80 percent of
the total acreage. Statistics for the selected farm in Center, called C-farm, and in Ile de France,
called IdF-farm, are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
10 Centre is a region with lower
expected area yields and lower area yield variability (in terms of coefficient of variation) than
Ile de France. Farm cash price of the C-farm is lower that of the IdF-farm in expectation but
higher in variability. Skewness parameters are slightly higher than zero, indicating that the
empirical probability distribution functions are slightly  disymmetric. Likewise, Kurtosis
parameters are slightly positive, i.e., the right-hand side tail of the distribution is heavier than the
left-hand side one. The correlation between cash and futures prices is higher for the C-Farm than
for the IdF-farm, whereas farm and area yields are more correlated for the IdF-farm than for the
C-farm. The negative correlation between farm yields and prices is, in absolute value, slightly
lower for futures prices than for farm cash prices for both farms, indicating the role of local
factors effects on the price basis. Finally, farm cash prices are more correlated with area yields
than with farm yields for both farms.
Concerning the C-farm, the initial wealth ( 0 w ) is set at 20000€, the acreage of wheat ( A) is
120 hectares, the production cost per hectare (c) is 354€ and the direct subsidies per hectare (d)
is 306€. In the case of the IdF-farm, these parameters are  000 , 10 0 = w ,  90 = A ,  382 = c  and
346 = d . Finally, the producer’s relative risk aversion parameter is set at  2 = q  in order to
represent moderate aversion toward risk. This implies that he exhibits a prudent behavior with a
constant relative prudence parameter equal to 3.
Simulations of yield and price distributions and computations of optimal hedge ratios and
willingness to receive measures are conducted with the CO module in GAUSS software and
with EXCEL. From the 5,000 simulation runs, the farm gross revenue per hectare, i.e., farm
cash price times farm yield, has a mean estimated at 873€ for the C-farm and 1147€ for the IdF-
farm. Its coefficient of variation is equal to 27% and 20%, respectively. The fair insurance
premium for the C-farm (resp. the IdF-farm) is equal to 1.07€/ha (resp. 0.37€/ha) under IYCI,
0.12€/ha (resp. 1.13€/ha) under AYCI, 18.58€/ha (resp. 11.89€/ha) under IRI, 11.04€/ha (resp.




Futures and straddle hedge ratios are defined as the number of contracts per unit of expected
output selected by the producer. From the hedging strategy in equation (14) and the producer’s
final wealth in equation (16), we denote the futures hedge ratio as  ) ( FHR y A x = , the hedge
ratio of the straddle at strike price  F k · = 9 . 0 1  as  ( ) y A z1 S1HR = , the hedge ratio of the
                                                                
10 Conversion factors are: 1 hectare (ha)=2.471 acres; 1 quintal=100 kg=3.68 bushels.
11 In other words, the fair insurance premium rate, expressed in percentage of the expected revenue, for the C-farm
(resp. the IdF-farm) is equal to 0.11% (resp. 0.03%) under IYCI, 0.01% (resp. 0.11%) under AYCI, 1.97% ( resp.
1.01%) under IRI, 1.21 (resp. 1.90%) under ARI and 2.52% (resp. 1.22%) under CRC.10
straddle at strike price  F k = 2  as  ( ) y A z2 S2HR =  and the hedge ratio of the straddle at strike
price  F k · = 1 . 1 3  as  ( ) y A z3 S3HR = .
The beta coefficient, well known in the Capital Asset pricing Model, measures the sensitivity
of farm cash price to movements in futures prices. It is the slope of the linear regression of farm
cash on futures prices. It is equal to 1.29 for the selected farm in Centre and to 0.68 for the
selected farm in Ile de France.
12 If there was no production risk, the optimal unbiased futures
hedge ratio would thus reduce to the beta coefficient, a well known result in the optimal hedging
literature (see, for example, Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha, 1984).
Table 3 shows the optimal hedge ratios under alternative insurance policies when futures
markets are perceived as unbiased, i.e.,  f E F
~
= . Consider first the optimal futures hedge ratios
when options are not available. They are lower than their associated beta coefficients, whatever
the insurance policy, for the two selected farms. This would be due to the prudent behavior of
the producer who is induced to reduce his futures hedge ratio when yields are random (Losq,
1982), and to the negative correlation between yields and prices which creates a natural hedge.
13
The futures hedge ratios are lower under revenue insurance than under yield insurance because
revenue insurance offers partial coverage against price variability. It is also of interest to notice
that the futures hedge ratio is higher under the IYCI contract than when no insurance is available
because of the negative price-yield correlation. When options contracts are available, the
producer would select a higher futures hedge ratio whatever the insurance policy for the two
selected farms. Therefore, the availability of straddles increases the demand for futures: options
and futures contracts are complementary. Observe that the previous finding when no options
were available still hold. The optimal hedge ratio of the straddle with the lowest strike price,
S1HR, is non-positive (i.e., no short position) under all insurance policies for the two selected
farms. In addition, S1HR is, in absolute value, higher under yield insurance than under revenue
insurance. The position for the straddle at strike price  F k = 2 , S2HR, is close to zero, except
under ARI for the two selected farms and CRC for the C-farm. Finally, the optimal hedging
strategy  S  entails selling straddles at the highest strike price  3 k , S3HR>0, under all insurance
policies for the two selected farms.
The futures and straddles hedge ratios characterize the shape of the optimal hedging strategy
S , as shown in equation (15). The futures hedge ratio gives the general trend of the optimal
hedging strategy  S  while the straddle hedge ratio expresses the curvature of  S  around its strike
price. The slopes of the piecewise linear hedging strategy,  ( ) f S¢ , are reported in Table 4. Since
these values are negative, the optimal hedging strategy is a decreasing function of the realized
futures price. It is not globally concave for all realized future prices, except under ARI for the
selected farm in  Centre. It is globally convex around the lowest strike price  1 k  under all
insurance policies for the two selected farms, except under ARI for the C-farm and under CRC
and IRI for the IdF-farm where it is linear. Around the intermediate strike price  2 k , the C-farm’s
optimal hedging strategy is linear, except under ARI and CRC where it is globally concave. For
the IdF-farm,  S  is globally concave around  2 k  under IRI or CRC, linear under ARI and
globally convex otherwise. Finally, the optimal hedging strategy is globally concave around the
highest strike price  3 k  under every insurance policies for the two selected farms.
                                                                
12 These regression parameters are significant at the 0.05 level.
13 If the elasticity of individual output with respect to the individual cash price would be equal to –1, then the
individual gross revenue would be nonrandom and, therefore, fair insurance and hedging contracts would be
useless.11
The impact of perceived bias in futures prices at planting on optimal hedging positions is
examined for the selected farm in Centre with no insurance, individual yield insurance IYCI or
individual revenue insurance IRI. Optimal hedge ratios when the futures market exhibits normal
backwardation (i.e., negative futures price bias),  unbiasedness (i.e., no futures price bias) or
contango (i.e., positive futures price bias) are reported in Table 5. Three hedging strategies are
successively considered: futures contracts is only available, then straddles at a single strike price
F k = 2  are introduced in addition to futures contracts and, finally, futures contracts and
straddles at three different strike prices are at the producer’s disposal. The hedge ratio is broken
down into two parts: a pure hedge component and a speculative component. The latter is
characterized by the deviation of the ratio in biased markets from that in unbiased markets. Of
course, this speculative component is null under unbiased futures markets and thus the hedge
ratio is equal to the pure hedge component.
The optimal futures hedge ratio is first analyzed. It is noteworthy that the pure hedge
component is always a short position.  Contango induces the producer to select a short
speculative position, whereas normal backwardation implies a long speculative position, with or
without available straddles contracts. Such a speculative behavior seems to be consistent with
the optimal hedging behavior in futures markets when the production is nonrandom (see, for
example, Briys, Crouhy and Schlesinger, 1993). Introducing straddles at a single strike price
F k = 2  does not significantly affect the optimal futures hedge ratio. On the contrary, when
straddles at three different strike prices are at the producer’s disposal, the speculative component
of the future hedge ratio is quite sensitive to the perceived bias in the futures price at planting.
Normal backwardation induces the producer to ‘go long’ in futures contracts and to take a so-
called ‘Texan position’; the long speculative position is thus higher than the short pure hedge
position. The futures hedge ratio is greater than 6 when the futures price at planting is perceived
to be two percent higher than the expected futures price, while it was less than 2 when straddles
were unavailable. Hence, offering straddles at three different strike prices gives the producer the
opportunity to adopt a more aggressive speculative futures position. Such an attitude is
increased by the absence of transaction costs.
14 Finally, the futures hedge ratio increases with
the futures bias (in either direction), with or without available straddles.
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When straddles are available at a single strike price, in addition to futures, the straddle ratio is
not very sensitive to bias in the futures price. When straddles are three strike prices are offered
to the producer, straddle ratios become quite sensitive. The optimal hedge ratio of the straddle at
the highest strike price, S3HR, evolves as the futures hedge ratio does; the optimal position is
long (resp. short) under normal backwardation (resp. contango) and it increases with the bias (in
either direction). The hedge ratio of the straddle at the lowest strike price, S1HR, acts in the
opposite direction: the optimal position is short ( resp. long) if normal  backwardation ( resp.
contango) prevails in the futures market. It increases with the bias (in either direction). The
position of the straddle at the intermediate strike is less sensitive to the perceived bias than the
two other straddle contracts. The optimal position is short when the futures market exhibits
contango while it can be either long or short under normal backwardation.
                                                                
14 We restrict our analysis to bias in futures prices, in absolute value, lower than or equal to 2 percent because
greater bias would generate higher hedge ratios that are not realistic without taking into account transaction costs.
15 This relationship is far from obvious in a theoretical viewpoint. One can easily show that when futures are only
available and in the absence of production and basis risks, a sufficient condition for the producer to increase his
short futures position as the futures price at planting increases is to have a degree of relative risk aversion lower
than unity. For a producer with a degree of relative risk aversion higher than unity, as it is the case in our simulation
model, the relationship between the short futures position and the futures price at planting may be either negative or
positive.12
The impact of insurance guarantee on the optimal futures and straddles positions is evaluated
when the producer is endowed with individual yield insurance IYCI or individual revenue
insurance IRI. Results are reported in Table 6. As the insurance guarantee increases, the optimal
futures hedge ratio increases under IYCI and decreases under IRI, with or without available
straddles. Such relationships are observed by Coble, Heifner and Zuniga (2000) when futures
are only available. Table 6 shows that the complementarity between futures and crop yield
insurance and the substitutability between futures and crop revenue insurance should hold when
straddles are also offered to the producer. Observe that the IRI contract at 120% guarantee level
should induce the IdF-farm to buy futures (FHR<0). This long futures position slightly increases
when straddles are available. On the contrary, the C-farm’s futures hedge ratio under the same
insurance contract is positive and far from zero. Additional simulations not reported in the Table
show that the it does not tend to zero as the insurance guarantee level increases over 120%. This
seems to show that the rationale for the use of futures in addition to individual revenue
insurance contract stems not only from some maximum limits on the guarantee level, but also
from the imperfect correlation between farm cash prices and futures prices. This means that the
slope of the first-best hedging strategy expressed in equation (6) is positive, i.e., the covariance
term is positive. In all other cases, introducing straddles induces the producers to increase their
short futures position. Straddles positions are almost insensitive to changes in insurance
guarantee levels.
Performance of hedging instruments
The increased producer welfare from risk reduction generated by insurance policy and/or
financial contracts is evaluated by a willingness to receive measure (WTR). It is calculated as
the amount of sure income that must be provided to the producer in the case where risk
management instruments are not available, in order to generate the same level of expected utility
achieved when these risk management tools are available and efficiently used. For instance, the
WTR of the crop insurance contract  i in the case where no insurance and hedging tools are
available, denoted 
i
1 WTR , is defined by:
(17) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i y c y p Eu NI y c y p Eu 1 WTR ~ ~ ~ ~ + - = + - .
Performance associated to risk management strategy  rm1 with respect to another risk
management strategy rm2 where some instruments are not available is measured by the WTR
for rm1 in the case where rm2 is at the producer’s disposal. It is important to notice that contrary
to a widespread belief (see, for example, Wang et al., 1998) there is no theoretical basis to state
that the WTR measure is additive.
16 For example, the addition of futures and straddles to the
portfolio where insurance is available is not equal to difference between the WTR of insurance,
futures and straddles when no hedging tools are available, and the WTR of insurance when no
hedging and insurance contracts are available. Formally, define 
i
2 WTR  and 
i
3 WTR  as
(18) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i y c y p Eu f S NI y c y p Eu 2
* WTR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + - = + + -
and
(19) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i NI y c y p Eu f S NI y c y p Eu 3
* WTR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + + - = + + - ,
                                                                
16 See Pope and Chavas (1985) for an analysis on the welfare economics of producer behavior under uncertainty.13
where  (.)
* S  is the optimal hedging strategy. Therefore, 
i
3 WTR  may be either higher than, or
equal to, or lower than  ( )
i i
1 2 WTR WTR - . This possible non-additivity of WTR under risk is
illustrated using our simulation results.
The performance of insurance and financial contracts, measured in terms of WTR, are
reported in Tables 7 and 8 for the selected farm in Centre and in  Ile de France, respectively.
Suppose first that insurance contracts are only available. The existence of an insurance market
increases the C-farm’s WTR in the range of 0.10€/ha to 12.77€/ha, and the IdF-farm’s WTR in
the range of 0.86€/ha to 3.29€/ha. These positive, but sometimes low, WTR are not surprising at
all because it is well-known that insurance (in which the index used in the indemnity payoff is
positively correlated with the individual loss) sold at a fair price reduces the agent’s exposure to
risk without reducing his expected wealth and, therefore, it increases the risk-averse agent’s
welfare. It is noteworthy that the producer may refuse to buy an insurance contract if the loading
rate was positive and sufficiently high.
17 This means that the WTR of the insurance policy
would be negative. For example, additional simulations not reported here show that the C-farm
(resp. IdF-farm) would refuse to buy the IYCI contract if the loading factor was at least equal to
44% (resp. 31%) and the IRI contract if it was at least equal to 68% (resp. 35%). Tables 7 and 8
show that individual insurance outperforms area insurance for the two selected farms. This
means that the welfare gains provided by a higher insurance guarantee level under area yield
insurance does not offset the losses due to the uninsurable yield basis risk. However, the IdF-
farm should prefer the ARI contract to the IRI contract if the guarantee level of the latter was
reduced from 80% to 70%. Replacing a crop yield insurance policy with a revenue insurance
contract increases the producer’s welfare because the price risk becomes partially covered. CRC
is preferred to IRI by the two selected farms. However, additional simulations show that, for an
amount of premium equal to that of CRC, IRI guarantee level would be 82.4% (resp. 81.3%)
and the associated WTR would be 14.23€/ha (resp. 3.72€/ha) for the C-farm (resp. IdF-farm).
They would thus be greater than the WTR of the CRC policy. This example tends to show that
the superiority of the CRC policy among producers may be caused by the constraints on
insurance guarantee level which generate higher expected net indemnities under CRC than
under IRI. This is consistent with numerical results based on U.S. data obtained by Heifner and
Coble (1998).
When unbiased futures contracts are introduced, in addition to insurance, the additional WTR
provided by these contracts is higher under yield insurance than under revenue insurance. This is
due to the absence of price protection under yield insurance, contrary to revenue insurance.
However, the combination of IYCI and futures may outperform the combination of IRI and
futures, as illustrated in the case of the C-farm (24.45€/ha and 23.57€/ha, respectively). The
availability of straddles in addition to unbiased futures entails small welfare improvements in
terms of WTR. This is the direct consequence of the small quantities of straddles in the optimal
hedging strategy, as shown in Table 3.
Suppose now that the futures market exhibits normal  backwardation; the futures price at
planting is perceived to be one percent lower than the expected price. When futures are only
available, the WTR is lower than under the unbiased market because the hedging strategy is less
effective in risk reduction. The availability of straddles, in addition to biased futures and fair
insurance significantly increases the WTR, contrary to the unbiased case. These additional gains
lie between 3.05€/ha to 3.49€/ha for the C-farm, and between 3.52€/ha to 4.03€/ha for the IdF-
farm. The WTR of insurance and hedging contracts in the case where no insurance and hedging
tools are available is higher when the futures market is unbiased for the C-farm and when it
                                                                
17 The loading factor is usually expressed in percentage of the actuarially fair premium, i.e., the expected indemnity.14
exhibits normal backwardation for the IdF-farm. The selected farm in Ile de France thus takes a
better advantage of the options market than the selected farm in Centre does.
As noticed previously, the WTR measure turns out to be non-additive in many cases. It is
either slightly higher or slightly lower than the difference in the associated WTR. For instance,
in the case of the C-farm, the WTR for IRI and futures is 23.57€/ha and the WTR for IRI is
11.80€/ha in the case where no insurance and hedging instruments are available, while the WTP
for IRI and futures when IRI is available is 11.34€/ha. The latter is thus lower than the
difference in WTR which equal to 11.77€/ha. On the contrary, when CRC is available, the
difference in the WTR measures (13.34€/ha) is lower than the associated WTR (13.53€/ha).
18
Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis on the optimal hedging demand against price risk with futures
and options when crop yield and revenue insurance contracts are also available. The demand of
an insured producer is shown to differ from that of an uninsured producer. However, introducing
a crop yield insurance policy does not affect the form of the optimal hedging contract for a
producer with a quadratic utility function. Numerical simulations are conducted using French
individual data. They stress the complementarity between futures and options contracts. The
demand for straddles would be rather limited when the futures market is unbiased, while it
would significantly increase as the futures market exhibits normal backwardation or contango.
The availability of straddles would induce the producer to adopt a more aggressive speculative
position on the futures market. Revenue insurance tends to result in lower demand for futures
contracts, with or without available straddles, than for yield insurance. The futures hedge ratio
would increase with the yield insurance guarantee. On the contrary, it would decrease as the
revenue insurance guarantee increases. Straddles positions are almost insensitive to changes in
insurance guarantee levels.
The availability of unbiased futures contracts would significantly increase the producer’s
welfare, in terms of willingness to receive. It would be reduced if normal  backwardation
prevails on the futures market. Straddles are shown to be weakly performing when the futures
market is unbiased, while they are more performing when the futures market exhibits normal
backwardation.
These findings should be tempered, however, by the fact that the size of our sample is small,
only two individual farms have been considered and transaction costs have been ignored. In
addition, they may be sensitive to the specific assumptions used to implement the numerical
model. Consequently, these results must be viewed as exploratory. Nevertheless, they provide
interesting results on the demand for hedging against price risk with both futures contracts and
straddles at three different strike prices. Further research would examine other crops and
regions, and would introduce transaction costs.
                                                                
18 We recognize that these differences of a few percents may also be due to approximations in the simulation
procedure. However, they only illustrate the fact that the WTR measure is not addititive and they cannot be used to
infirm this non-additivity.15
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Appendix
First-best hedging contract under revenue insurance
Since the marginal payoff function appears neither in the objective function nor in the
constraints, the maximization problem (1) with final wealth (3) can be solved by using Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for  ( ) p J  for all  p . The first-order condition with respect to  ( ) p J  is
(A1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ~ ~ = - F + - + + - ¢ ml p P p J y p NI y c y p u E   for all  p ,
where  m  and  ( ) p F  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the premium constraint and
the non-negative indemnity constraint respectively, with








0   if 0 p J
p
For all  ( ) 0 : = p J p , (A1) can be rewritten as
(A3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ~ ~ £ - - + - ¢ = ml P y p NI y c y p u E p K ,
and its first derivative is
(A4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] P y p NI y c y p u y p I N y p E p K - + - ¢ ¢ ¢ + = ¢ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ .
If the producer is not over-indemnified when a loss occurs, i.e.,  ( ) 1 - ‡ ¢ z I N  with a strict
inequality at some  z , and under risk aversion,  K  is decreasing with  p . This implies that the








ˆ   if 0 p p
p J
For all  ( ) 0 : > p J p , we have
(A6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ml = - + + - ¢ P p J y p NI y c y p u E ~ ~ .
Differentiating (A6) with respect to  p  yields
(A7) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ = - + + - ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¢ + P p J y p NI y c y p u p J y p I N y E .
Rearranging the terms gives equation (6).17
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Note: (*) significant at the 0.05 level; (**) significant at the 0.1 level.
a Coefficient of variation = standard deviation / mean.
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Note: (*) significant at the 0.05 level; (**) significant at the 0.1 level.
a Coefficient of variation = standard deviation / mean.18
Table 3. Optimal hedge ratios under unbiased futures markets.
Centre Ile de France
Futures Straddles Futures Straddles
          FHR    S1HR   S2HR    S3HR         FHR      S1HR      S2HR    S3HR
No ins. 1.18 (1.04) -0.14 0.00 0.11 0.56 (0.47) -0.10 -0.02 0.06
IYCI 1.22 (1.10) -0.13 0.00 0.08 0.57 (0.48) -0.10 -0.01 0.05
AYCI 1.19 (1.06) -0.13 0.00 0.10 0.60 (0.53) -0.08 -0.01 0.04
IRI 1.00 (0.89) -0.06 0.00 0.13 0.40 (0.35) 0.00 0.02 0.09
ARI 0.93 (0.88) 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.44 (0.32) -0.06 0.00 0.14
CRC 1.08 (1.00) -0.06 0.11 0.09 0.40 (0.37) 0.00 0.06 0.05
Note: positive values correspond to short positions. Numbers in parenthesis are optimal hedge ratios when futures
are only available.
Table 4. Optimal hedging strategy with futures and straddles under unbiased futures markets.
Centre Ile de France
Marginal hedging strategy S’(f) Marginal hedging strategy S’(f)
f<k1 k1<f<k2 k2<f<k3 f>k3 f<k1 k1<f<k2 k2<f<k3 f>k3
No ins. -1.21 -0.93 -0.93 -1.15 -0.62 -0.42 -0.38 -0.50
IYCI -1.27 -1.01 -1.01 -1.17 -0.63 -0.43 -0.41 -0.51
AYCI -1.22 -0.96 -0.96 -1.16 -0.65 -0.49 -0.47 -0.55
IRI -0.93 -0.81 -0.81 -1.07 -0.29 -0.29 -0.33 -0.51
ARI -0.75 -0.75 -0.87 -1.11 -0.36 -0.24 -0.24 -0.52
CRC -0.94 -0.82 -1.04 -1.22 -0.29 -0.29 -0.41 -0.5119
Table 5. Optimal hedge ratios under biased futures markets, selected farm in Centre.
Bias Futures only Futures and straddle at a
single strike price F
Futures and straddles at three
different strike prices
          FHR            FHR          S2HR        FHR  S1HR  S2HR   S3HR
No ins.
-2% 0.43 0.43 0.06 -2.87 2.20 0.09 -3.58
-1% 0.81 0.81 0.00 -0.32 1.03 -0.09 -0.99
  0% 1.04 1.04 -0.02 1.18 -0.14 0.00 0.11
+1% 1.27 1.27 -0.04 2.79 -1.72 0.23 0.87
+2% 1.65 1.66 -0.06 6.32 -5.76 0.98 1.46
IYCI
-2% 0.48 0.48 0.05 -2.96 2.27 0.12 -3.74
-1% 0.87 0.87 0.00 -0.32 1.07 -0.08 -1.06
  0% 1.10 1.10 0.00 1.22 -0.13 0.00 0.08
+1% 1.34 1.34 -0.05 2.89 -1.75 0.23 0.89
+2% 1.73 1.74 -0.07 6.56 -5.92 0.98 1.56
IRI
-2% 0.25 0.25 0.14 -3.27 2.49 0.05 -3.68
-1% 0.65 0.65 0.08 -0.57 1.18 -0.11 -1.00
  0% 0.89 0.89 0.05 1.00 -0.06 0.01 0.13
+1% 1.14 1.13 -0.02 2.67 -1.70 0.23 0.92
+2% 1.53 1.53 -0.01 6.31 -5.87 1.02 4.54
Note: positive values correspond to short positions.20
Table 6. Optimal hedge ratios for alternative insurance design under unbiased futures markets.
Centre Ile de France
Insurance
guarantee
Futures Straddles Futures Straddles
level           FHR    S1HR   S2HR    S3HR         FHR      S1HR      S2HR    S3HR
IYCI
60% 1.18 (1.04) -0.14 -0.01 0.10 0.56  (0.47) -0.10 -0.02 0.06
80% 1.22 (1.10) -0.13 0.00 0.08 0.60  (0.53) -0.08 -0.01 0.04
100% 1.32 (1.22) -0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.64  (0.58) -0.10 -0.01 -0.01
120% 1.43 (1.33) -0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.73  (0.67) -0.13 -0.01 -0.04
IRI
60% 1.15 (1.02) -0.11 0.00 0.11 0.55  (0.47) -0.08 -0.03 0.06
80% 1.00 (0.89) -0.06 0.00 0.13 0.40  (0.35) 0.00 0.02 0.09
100% 0.80 (0.70) -0.05 0.00 0.13 0.16  (0.06) -0.03 0.00 0.16
120% 0.64 (0.53) -0.08 0.00 0.12 -0.05 (-0.14) -0.06 -0.01 0.09
Note: positive values correspond to short positions. Numbers in parenthesis are optimal hedge ratios when futures
are only available.
Table 7. Willingness to receive (€/ha) under unbiased and biased futures markets, selected farm
in Centre.







No ins. - 16.67
a 16.72
a (0.05





c) 17.70 (11.10) 21.19 (14.66; 3.37)
AYCI 0.10 17.17 (17.06) 17.22 (17.02; 0.04) 10.70 (10.37) 14.01 (13.76; 3.22)
IRI 11.80 23.57 (11.34) 23.85 (11.39; 0.04) 18.52 (5.93) 21.70 (9.15; 3.05)
ARI 6.08 17.54 (11.12) 17.71 (11.29; 0.14) 12.24 (5.69) 15.22 (9.30; 3.42)
CRC 12.77 26.11 (13.53) 26.46 (13.64; 0.11) 20.20 (7.23) 23.83 (10.89; 3.49)
a WTR in the case where no insurance and no hedging contracts are available.
b WTR in the case where insurance is only available.
c WTR in the case where insurance and futures are only available.21
Table 8. Willingness to receive (€/ha) under unbiased and biased futures markets, selected farm
in Ile de France.







No ins. -- 3.06
a 3.09
a (0.03





c) 1.90 (0.85) 5.59 (4.47; 3.65)
AYCI 0.86 4.84 (3.88) 4.86 (3.91; 0.02) 2.17 (1.24) 5.98 (4.98; 3.71)
IRI 3.09 4.84 (1.62) 4.89 (1.58; 0.04) 3.45 (0.45) 7.29 (4.12; 3.70)
ARI 2.93 4.69 (1.21) 4.74 (1.26; 0.04) 3.42 (0.11) 7.14 (3.62; 3.52)
CRC 3.29 5.28 (2.00) 5.34 (2.06; 0.05) 3.52 (0.25) 7.74 (4.41; 4.03)
a WTR in the case where no insurance and no hedging contracts are available.
b WTR in the case where insurance is only available.
c WTR in the case where insurance and futures are only available.